Госпереворот происходит в Гвинее-Бисау

Президент страны Умару Сисоку Эмбало задержан военными. Как утверждает издание Jeune Afrique, президент сам дозвонился до редакции и сообщил об этом.

По его словам, переворот организован начальником Генерального штаба армии.

A Friendly Reminder That Your Unpowered SSDs Are Probably Losing Data

Save a bunch of files on a good ol’ magnetic hard drive, leave it in a box, and they’ll probably still be there a couple of decades later. The lubricants might have all solidified and the heads jammed in place, but if you can get things moving, you’ll still have your data. As explained over at [XDA Developers], though, SSDs can’t really offer the same longevity.

It all comes down to power. SSDs are considered non-volatile storage—in that they hold on to data even when power is removed. However, they can only do so for a rather limited amount of time. This is because of the way NAND flash storage works. It involves trapping a charge in a floating gate transistor to store a single bit of data. You can power down an SSD, and the trapped charge in all the NAND flash transistors will happily stay put. But over longer periods of time, from months to years, that charge can leak out. When this happens, data is lost.

Depending on your particular SSD, and the variety of NAND flash it uses (TLC, QLC, etc), the safe storage time may be anywhere from a few months to a few years. The process takes place faster at higher temperatures, too, so if you store your drives in a warm area, you could see surprisingly rapid loss.

Ultimately, it’s worth checking your drive specs and planning accordingly. Going on a two-week holiday? Your PC will probably be just fine switched off. Going to prison for three to five years with only a slim chance of parole? Maybe back up to a hard drive first, or have your cousin switch your machine on now and then for safety’s sake.

On a vaguely related note, we’ve even seen SSDs that can self-destruct on purpose. If you’ve got the low down on other neat solid-state stories, don’t hesitate to notify the tipsline.

hackaday.com/2025/11/26/a-frie…

Benchmarking Chinese CPUs

When it comes to PCs, Westerners are most most familiar with x86/x64 processors from Intel and AMD, with Apple Silicon taking up a significant market share, too. However, in China, a relatively new CPU architecture is on the rise. A fabless semiconductor company called Loongson has been producing chips with its LoongArch architecture since 2021. These chips remain rare outside China, but some in the West have been benchmarking them.

[Daniel Lemire] has recently blogged about the performance of the Loongson 3A6000, which debuted in late 2023. The chip was put through a range of simple benchmarking tests, involving float processing and string transcoding operations. [Daniel] compared it to the Intel Xeon Gold 6338 from 2021, noting the Intel chip pretty much performed better across the board. No surprise given its extra clock rate. Meanwhile, the gang over at [Chips and Cheese] ran even more exhaustive tests on the same chip last year. The Loongson was put through typical tasks like compressing archives and encoding video. The outlet came to the conclusion that the chip was a little weaker than older CPUs like AMD’s Zen 2 line and Intel’s 10th generation Core chips. It’s also limited as a four-core chip compared to modern Intel and AMD lines that often start at 6 cores as a minimum.

If you find yourself interested in Loongson’s product, don’t get too excited. They’re not exactly easy to lay your hands on outside of China, and even the company’s own website is difficult to access from beyond those shores. You might try reaching out to Loongson-oriented online communities if you seek such hardware.

Different CPU architectures have perhaps never been more relevant, particularly as we see the x86 stalwarts doing battle with the rise of desktop and laptop ARM processors. If you’ve found something interesting regarding another obscure kind of CPU, don’t hesitate to let the tipsline know!

hackaday.com/2025/11/26/benchm…

Building a Low-Cost Satellite Tracker

Looking up at the sky just after sunset or just before sunrise will reveal a fairly staggering amount of satellites orbiting overhead, from tiny cubesats to the International Space Station. Of course these satellites are always around, and even though you’ll need specific conditions to view them with the naked eye, with the right radio antenna and only a few dollars in electronics you can see exactly which ones are flying by at any time.

[Josh] aka [Ham Radio Crash Course] is demonstrating this build on his channel and showing every step needed to get something like this working. The first part is finding the correct LoRa module, which will be the bulk of the cost of this project. Unlike those used for most Meshtastic nodes, this one needs to be built for the 433 MHz band. The software running on this module is from TinyGS, which we have featured here before, and which allows a quick and easy setup to listen in to these types of satellites. This build goes much further into detail on building the antenna, though, and also covers some other ancillary tasks like mounting it somewhere outdoors.

With all of that out of the way, though, the setup is able to track hundreds of satellites on very little hardware, as well as display information about each of them. We’d always favor a build that lets us gather data like this directly over using something like a satellite tracking app, although those do have their place. And of course, with slightly more compute and a more directed antenna there is all kinds of other data beaming down that we can listen in on as well, although that’s not always the intent.

youtube.com/embed/V6RJG9q7R8M?…

hackaday.com/2025/11/26/buildi…

FLOSS Weekly Episode 856: QT: Fix It Please, My Mom is Calling

This week Jonathan chats with Maurice Kalinowski about QT! That’s the framework that runs just about anywhere, making it easy to write cross-platform applications. What’s the connection with KDE? And how has this turned into a successful company? Watch to find out!

• qt.io/

youtube.com/embed/pMSStjolrRA?…

Did you know you can watch the live recording of the show right on our YouTube Channel? Have someone you’d like us to interview? Let us know, or have the guest contact us! Take a look at the schedule here.

play.libsyn.com/embed/episode/…

Direct Download in DRM-free MP3.

If you’d rather read along, here’s the transcript for this week’s episode.

Places to follow the FLOSS Weekly Podcast:

• Spotify
• RSS

Theme music: “Newer Wave” Kevin MacLeod (incompetech.com)

Licensed under Creative Commons: By Attribution 4.0 License

hackaday.com/2025/11/26/floss-…

Elli Furedy Brings Cyberpunk Games to Life

When you’re designing a bounty hunter game for a five-day cyberpunk live-action-role-play out in the middle of the Mojave desert, you’ve got to bring something extra cool. But [Elli]’s Hackaday Supercon talk isn’t just about the hardware; it’s as much about the design philosophy behind the game – how you bring something immersive and exciting to hundreds of players.

Sandbox Systems

The game itself is fairly simple: bounty hunters try to find the bounty, and when they do, they have a quick-draw to see who wins. Everyone is issued a color-coded Portable Data Node device, and when a hunter jacks into a bounty’s Node, a countdown begins, and the first to press the button after the display say “Go” wins.

But the simplicity of the game is by design, and [Elli] talks about the philosophy that she and her team followed to make it a success. If you’re designing a conference badge or an immersive game for a large group of people, take note.

The first principle is to focus on the people first before the tech. Here, that essentially means making the experience as simple as possible in order to leave room for the players to put their own spin on it – it’s a role-play event after all.

Next is providing opportunities over demands. In this game, for instance, if you’re playing the bounty hunter role, you have to deliver a “Declaration of Intent to Seize” when you encounter a bounty player, but what deciding on your personal catchphrase for this is left up to you.

Embedding the rules of the game in the hardware is perhaps the most involved of the principles. The Data Nodes decide the winner and the loser, report it automatically over WiFi to a central scoreboard, and has anti-button-mashing provisions. These and many more examples of embedding the rules help make the game both fair and simple – nobody has to break the flow to look things up in a rule book or remember who gives what token to whom.

Selling the story of the game with the tech is also important. For instance, there is a part of the Node that [Elli] calls “the doodad” which is just pure LED and greebles. It doesn’t do anything, but it looks cool.

Finally, [Elli] mentions that her team puts an effort into making the game as accessible for everyone as possible. The onboarding video has cyberpunk-styled closed captioning, for instance. While originally designed for folks who don’t hear well, it ended up providing an aesthetic that everyone can enjoy – an example of the curb-cut effect at work.

The end result? 374 players played 3,838 matches over five days, but that’s just the stats. As [Elli] points out, the real point of the game is as an ice-breaker, to allow people room to explore whatever character they’re playing, and to connect people in real-space. It sounds like it was a complete success on all fronts.

The Sandbox

This is a talk on design principles, but it’s also a talk at Supercon, and [Elli] gets pulled into the hardware side of things many times throughout the talk. The Nodes have OLEDs and haptic motors for feedback, they use and ESP32 with WiFi for the score reporting, and there’s even discussion of the serial protocol that they speak to each other when they get connected up via an audio jack.

[Elli] gets some great questions about ways to expand the game, and you’re just going to have to watch the video to appreciate them all. Or join in: after all, it’s an open-source project and it’s intended to be a sandbox!

There seems to be a lot of room to play along, and [Elli]’s talk is definitely food for thought if you’re designing hardware with the end goal of creating and encouraging human interaction through building up an engaging story.

youtube.com/embed/ndodsA254HA?…

hackaday.com/2025/11/26/elli-f…

The Busch Electronic Digital-Technik 2075 Digital Lab from the 1970s

In a recent video, [Jason Jacques] demos the Busch Electronic Digital-Technik 2075 which was released in West Germany in the 1970s.

The Digital-Technik 2075 comes with a few components including a battery holder and 9 V battery, a push button, two 1 K resistors, a red LED, a 100 nF ceramic capacitor, a 100 µF electrolytic capacitor, a quad NAND gate IC, and a counter module which includes an IC and a 7-segment display. The kit also comes with wires, plugs, a breadboard, and a tool for extracting modules.

The Digital-Technik 2075 doesn’t use the spring terminals we see in other project labs of the time, such as the Science Fair kits from Radio Shack, and it doesn’t use modular Denshi blocks, such as we saw from the Gakken EX-150, but rather uses wire in conjunction with yellow plastic plugs. This seems to work well enough.

In the video, after showing us how to do switch debouncing, [Jason] runs us through making a counter with the digital components and then getting the counter to reset after it counts to five. This is done using NAND gates. Before he gets stuck into doing a project he takes a close look at the manual (which is in German) including some of the advertisements for other project labs from Busch which were available at the time. As he doesn’t speak German [Jason] prints out an English translation of the manual before working through it.

We’ve heard from [Jason] at Hackaday in recent history when we saw his Microtronic Phoenix Computer System which referenced the 2090 Microtronic Computer System which was also made by Busch.

youtube.com/embed/AhI8z8OgQyY?…

hackaday.com/2025/11/26/the-bu…

Chinese Regulators May Kill Retractable Car Door Handles That Never Should Have Existed

Headlights. Indicators. Trunk releases. Seatbelts. Airbags. Just about any part of a car you can think of is governed by a long and complicated government regulation. It’s all about safety, ensuring that the car-buying public can trust that their vehicles won’t unduly injure or maim them in regular operation, or in the event of accident.

However, one part of the modern automobile has largely escaped regulation—namely, the humble door handle. Automakers have been free to innovate with new and wacky designs, with Tesla in particular making waves with its electronic door handles. However, after a series of deadly incidents where doors wouldn’t open, regulators are now examining if these door handles are suitable for road-going automobiles. As always, regulations are written in blood, but it raises the question—was not the danger of these complicated electronic door handles easy to foresee?

Trapped

A number of automakers have developed fancy retractable door handles in recent years. They are most notably seen on electric vehicles, where they are stated to have a small but measurable aerodynamic benefit. They are often paired with buttons or other similar electronic controls to open the doors from the inside. Compared to mechanical door handles, however, these door handles come with a trade-off in complexity. They require electricity, motors, and a functioning control system to work. When all is well, this isn’t a problem. However, when things go wrong, a retractable electronic door handle often proves inaccessible and useless.

It’s not hard to find case reports of fatal incidents involving vehicles with electronic door handles—both inside and out. Multiple cases have involved occupants burning alive inside Tesla vehicles, in which electronic door handles failed after a crash. Passengers inside the vehicles have failed to escape due to not finding emergency release door pulls hidden in the door panels, while bystanders have similarly been unable to use the retracted outside door handles to free those trapped inside.

In response, some Tesla owners have gone so far as to release brightly-colored emergency escape ripcords to replace the difficult-to-spot emergency release pulls that are nearly impossible to find without prior knowledge. In the case of some older models, though, there’s less hope of escape. For example, in the Tesla Model 3 built from 2017 to 2023, only front doors have an emergency mechanical release. Rear passengers are out of luck, and must find another route of escape if their electronic door handles fail to operate. No Tesla vehicles feature an easily-accessible mechanical release that can be used from outside the vehicle.
US regulations mandate highly-visible emergency trunk release handles that are easily activated. However, obvious mechanical backups have not been required for cars fitted with electronic door handles. Credit: NHTSA
It’s worth noting that in the US market, federal regulations have mandated glow-in-the-dark trunk releases be fitted to all sedans from the 2002 model year onwards. You could theoretically escape from the trunk of certain Teslas more easily than a Cybertruck or Model 3 with a failed electrical system.

Tesla isn’t the only company out there building cars with retractable door handles. It does, however, remain the most prominent user of this technology, and its vehicles have been involved in numerous incidents that have made headlines. Other automakers, such as Audi and Fiat, have experimented with electronic door handles, both for ingress and egress, with varying degrees of mechanical backup available. In some cases, automakers have used smart two-stage latches. A small pull activates the electronic door release, while a stronger pull will engage a mechanical linkage that unlatches the door. It’s smart engineering—the door interface responds to the exact action a passenger would execute if trying to escape the vehicle in a panic. There are obviously less concerns around electronic door releases that have easily-accessed mechanical backups; it’s just that Tesla is particularly notable for not always providing them.

Over the years, national automotive bodies have thrown up their arms about all sorts of emerging automotive technologies. In the United States specifically, NHTSA has famously slow-walked the approval of things like camera-based rear-view mirror systems and replaceable-bulb headlamps, fearing the worst could occur if these technologies were freely allowed on the market.

Meanwhile, despite the obvious risks, electronic door handles have faced no major regulatory challenges. There were no obvious written rules standing in the way of Tesla making the choice to eliminate regular old door handles. Nor were there strict regulations on emergency door releases for passengers inside the vehicle. Tesla spent years building several models with no mechanical door release for the rear passengers. If your door button failed, you’d have to attempt escape by climbing out through the front doors, assuming you could figure out how to open them. Even today, the models with mechanical door releases still often hide them behind interior trim pieces or carpets, where few passengers would ever think to look in an emergency.

Obvious Mistakes

Flush door handles have become popular with Chinese automakers like BYD and Geely. However, these door handles require the vehicle’s electrical supply to be intact in order to work. Credit: BYD
Things are beginning to change, however. Chinese regulators have led the charge, with reports stating that electronic retractable door handles could be banned as soon as 2027. While some semi-retractable styles will potentially avoid an outright ban, it’s believed new regulations will require a mechanically redundant release system as standard.

As for the US, the sleeping giant of NHTSA has finally awoken in the wake of Bloomberg‘s reporting on the matter. As reported by CNBC, Tesla has been given a deadline of December 10 to deliver records to the federal regulator, regarding design, failures, and customer issues around its electronic door release systems. The Office of Defects Investigations within NHTSA has already recorded 16 reports of failed exterior door releases in the a single model year of the Tesla Model Y. It’s likely a drop in the ocean compared to the full population of Tesla vehicles currently on roads. Meanwhile, the US automaker also faces multiple lawsuits over the matter from those who have lost family members in fatal crashes and fires involving the company’s vehicles.

In due time, it’s likely that automotive regulators in most markets will come out against electronic door handles from a safety perspective alone. No matter how well designed the electrical system in a modern vehicle, it’s hard to beat a lever flipping a latch for simplicity and robustness. The benefits of these electronic door handles are spurious in the first place—a fraction of a percent reduction in drag, and perhaps a little more luxury appeal. If the trade-off is trapping passengers in the event of a fire, it’s hard to say they’re worthwhile.

The electronic door handle, then, is perhaps the ultimate triumph of form over function. They’re often slower and harder to use than a regular door handle, and particularly susceptible to becoming useless when iced over on a frosty morning. For a taste of the future, lives were put at risk. Anyone could see that, so it’s both strange and sad that automakers and regulators alike seemed not to notice until it was far too late. Any new regulations will, once again, be written in blood.

Reality Check: EU Council Chat Control Vote is Not a Retreat, But a Green Light for Indiscriminate Mass Surveillance and the End of Right to Communicate Anonymously

Contrary to headlines suggesting the EU has “backed away” from Chat Control, the negotiating mandate endorsed today by EU ambassadors in a close split vote paves the way for a permanent infrastructure of mass surveillance. Patrick Breyer, digital freedom fighter and expert on the file, warns journalists and the public not to be deceived by the label “voluntary.”

While the Council removed the obligation for scanning, the agreed text creates a toxic legal framework that incentivizes US tech giants to scan private communications indiscriminately, introduces mandatory age checks for all internet users, and threatens to exclude teenagers from digital life.

“The headlines are misleading: Chat Control is not dead, it is just being privatized,” warns Patrick Breyer. “What the Council endorsed today is a Trojan Horse. By cementing ‘voluntary’ mass scanning, they are legitimizing the warrantless, error-prone mass surveillance of millions of Europeans by US corporations, while simultaneously killing online anonymity through the backdoor of age verification.”

The Three Hidden Dangers of the Council’s “Voluntary” Deal

The Council’s mandate stands in sharp contrast to the European Parliament’s position, which demands that surveillance be targeted only at suspects and age checks are to remain voluntary. The Council’s approach introduces three critical threats that have largely gone unreported:

1. “Voluntary” Means Indiscriminate Mass Scanning (The Chat Control 1.0 Trap)
The text aims to make the temporary “Chat Control 1.0” regulation permanent. This allows providers like Meta or Google to scan all private chats, indiscriminately and without a court order.

• The Reality: This is not just about finding known illegal images. The mandate allows for the scanning of private text messages, unknown images, and metadata using unreliable algorithms and AI.
• The Failure: These algorithms are notoriously unreliable. The German Federal Police (BKA) has warned that 50% of all reports generated under the current voluntary scheme are criminally irrelevant.
• Breyer’s comment: “We are talking about tens of thousands of completely legal, private chats being leaked to police annually due to faulty algorithms and AI. This is no more reliable than guessing. Calling this ‘voluntary’ does not make the violation of the digital secrecy of correspondence any less severe.”

2. The Death of anonymous communications: Age Checks for Everyone
To comply with the Council’s requirement to “reliably identify minors,” providers will be forced to verify the age of every single user.

• The Reality: This means every citizen will effectively have to upload an ID or undergo a face scan to open an email or messenger account.
• The Consequence: This creates a de facto ban on anonymous communication—a vital lifeline for whistleblowers, journalists, political activists, and abuse victims seeking help.
• Unworkable alternative: Experts have warned that other methods for “Age assessment cannot be performed in a privacy-preserving way with current technology due to reliance on biometric, behavioural or contextual information… In fact, it incentivizes (children’s) data collection and exploitation. We conclude that age assessment presents an inherent disproportionate risk of serious privacy violation and discrimination, without guarantees of effectiveness.”

3. “Digital House Arrest” for Teenagers
Under the guise of protection, the Council text proposes barring users under 17 from using apps with chat functions—including WhatsApp, Instagram, and popular online games—unless stringent conditions are met.

• The Reality: This amounts to a “Digital House Arrest,” isolating youth from their social circles and digital education.
• Breyer’s comment: “Protection by exclusion is pedagogical nonsense. Instead of empowering teenagers, the Council wants to lock them out of the digital world entirely.”

A Dangerous Road to 2026

Today’s vote was far from unanimous, with the Czech Republic, the Netherlands, and Poland voting against, and Italy abstaining, reflecting deep concerns within the EU about the legality and proportionality of the measure.

Negotiations (“Trilogues”) between the Council and the European Parliament will soon begin, with the aim of finalizing the text before April 2026.

“We must stop pretending that ‘voluntary’ mass surveillance is acceptable in a democracy,” Breyer concludes. “We are facing a future where you need an ID card to send a message, and where foreign black-box AI decides if your private photos are suspicious. This is not a victory for privacy; it is a disaster waiting to happen.”

Background Information & Contact

About the Vote: The Council mandate was today endorsed by the Committee of Permanent Representatives (COREPER).
About the Procedure: The text will now be negotiated with the European Parliament. The Parliament’s mandate (adopted in Nov 2023) explicitly rules out indiscriminate scanning and demands targeted surveillance based on suspicion.

More information: chatcontrol.eu

patrick-breyer.de/en/reality-c…

Old tech, new vulnerabilities: NTLM abuse, ongoing exploitation in 2025

Just like the 2000s

Flip phones grew popular, Windows XP debuted on personal computers, Apple introduced the iPod, peer-to-peer file sharing via torrents was taking off, and MSN Messenger dominated online chat. That was the tech scene in 2001, the same year when Sir Dystic of Cult of the Dead Cow published SMBRelay, a proof-of-concept that brought NTLM relay attacks out of theory and into practice, demonstrating a powerful new class of authentication relay exploits.

Ever since that distant 2001, the weaknesses of the NTLM authentication protocol have been clearly exposed. In the years that followed, new vulnerabilities and increasingly sophisticated attack methods continued to shape the security landscape. Microsoft took up the challenge, introducing mitigations and gradually developing NTLM’s successor, Kerberos. Yet more than two decades later, NTLM remains embedded in modern operating systems, lingering across enterprise networks, legacy applications, and internal infrastructures that still rely on its outdated mechanisms for authentication.

Although Microsoft has announced its intention to retire NTLM, the protocol remains present, leaving an open door for attackers who keep exploiting both long-standing and newly discovered flaws.

In this blog post, we take a closer look at the growing number of NTLM-related vulnerabilities uncovered over the past year, as well as the cybercriminal campaigns that have actively weaponized them across different regions of the world.

How NTLM authentication works

NTLM (New Technology LAN Manager) is a suite of security protocols offered by Microsoft and intended to provide authentication, integrity, and confidentiality to users.

In terms of authentication, NTLM is a challenge-response-based protocol used in Windows environments to authenticate clients and servers. Such protocols depend on a shared secret, typically the client’s password, to verify identity. NTLM is integrated into several application protocols, including HTTP, MSSQL, SMB, and SMTP, where user authentication is required. It employs a three-way handshake between the client and server to complete the authentication process. In some instances, a fourth message is added to ensure data integrity.

The full authentication process appears as follows:

1. The client sends a NEGOTIATE_MESSAGE to advertise its capabilities.
2. The server responds with a CHALLENGE_MESSAGE to verify the client’s identity.
3. The client encrypts the challenge using its secret and responds with an AUTHENTICATE_MESSAGE that includes the encrypted challenge, the username, the hostname, and the domain name.
4. The server verifies the encrypted challenge using the client’s password hash and confirms its identity. The client is then authenticated and establishes a valid session with the server. Depending on the application layer protocol, an authentication confirmation (or failure) message may be sent by the server.

Importantly, the client’s secret never travels across the network during this process.

NTLM is dead — long live NTLM

Despite being a legacy protocol with well-documented weaknesses, NTLM continues to be used in Windows systems and hence actively exploited in modern threat campaigns. Microsoft has announced plans to phase out NTLM authentication entirely, with its deprecation slated to begin with Windows 11 24H2 and Windows Server 2025 (1, 2, 3), where NTLMv1 is removed completely, and NTLMv2 disabled by default in certain scenarios. Despite at least three major public notices since 2022 and increased documentation and migration guidance, the protocol persists, often due to compatibility requirements, legacy applications, or misconfigurations in hybrid infrastructures.

As recent disclosures show, attackers continue to find creative ways to leverage NTLM in relay and spoofing attacks, including new vulnerabilities. Moreover, they introduce alternative attack vectors inherent to the protocol, which will be further explored in the post, specifically in the context of automatic downloads and malware execution via WebDAV following NTLM authentication attempts.

Persistent threats in NTLM-based authentication

NTLM presents a broad threat landscape, with multiple attack vectors stemming from its inherent design limitations. These include credential forwarding, coercion-based attacks, hash interception, and various man-in-the-middle techniques, all of them exploiting the protocol’s lack of modern safeguards such as channel binding and mutual authentication. Prior to examining the current exploitation campaigns, it is essential to review the primary attack techniques involved.

Hash leakage

Hash leakage refers to the unintended exposure of NTLM authentication hashes, typically caused by crafted files, malicious network paths, or phishing techniques. This is a passive technique that doesn’t require any attacker actions on the target system. A common scenario involving this attack vector starts with a phishing attempt that includes (or links to) a file designed to exploit native Windows behaviors. These behaviors automatically initiate NTLM authentication toward resources controlled by the attacker. Leakage often occurs through minimal user interaction, such as previewing a file, clicking on a remote link, or accessing a shared network resource. Once attackers have the hashes, they can reuse them in a credential forwarding attack.

Coercion-based attacks

In coercion-based attacks, the attacker actively forces the target system to authenticate to an attacker-controlled service. No user interaction is needed for this type of attack. For example, tools like PetitPotam or PrinterBug are commonly used to trigger authentication attempts over protocols such as MS-EFSRPC or MS-RPRN. Once the victim system begins the NTLM handshake, the attacker can intercept the authentication hash or relay it to a separate target, effectively impersonating the victim on another system. The latter case is especially impactful, allowing immediate access to file shares, remote management interfaces, or even Active Directory Certificate Services, where attackers can request valid authentication certificates.

Credential forwarding

Credential forwarding refers to the unauthorized reuse of previously captured NTLM authentication tokens, typically hashes, to impersonate a user on a different system or service. In environments where NTLM authentication is still enabled, attackers can leverage previously obtained credentials (via hash leakage or coercion-based attacks) without cracking passwords. This is commonly executed through Pass-the-Hash (PtH) or token impersonation techniques. In networks where NTLM is still in use, especially in conjunction with misconfigured single sign-on (SSO) or inter-domain trust relationships, credential forwarding may provide extensive access across multiple systems.

This technique is often used to facilitate lateral movement and privilege escalation, particularly when high-privilege credentials are exposed. Tools like Mimikatz allow extraction and injection of NTLM hashes directly into memory, while Impacket’s wmiexec.py, PsExec.py, and secretsdump.py can be used to perform remote execution or credential extraction using forwarded hashes.

Man-in-the-Middle (MitM) attacks

An attacker positioned between a client and a server can intercept, relay, or manipulate authentication traffic to capture NTLM hashes or inject malicious payloads during the session negotiation. In environments where safeguards such as digital signing or channel binding tokens are missing, these attacks are not only possible but frequently easy to execute.

Among MitM attacks, NTLM relay remains the most enduring and impactful method, so much so that it has remained relevant for over two decades. Originally demonstrated in 2001 through the SMBRelay tool by Sir Dystic (member of Cult of the Dead Cow), NTLM relay continues to be actively used to compromise Active Directory environments in real-world scenarios. Commonly used tools include Responder, Impacket’s NTLMRelayX, and Inveigh. When NTLM relay occurs within the same machine from which the hash was obtained, it is also referred to as NTLM reflexion attack.

NTLM exploitation in 2025

Over the past year, multiple vulnerabilities have been identified in Windows environments where NTLM remains enabled implicitly. This section highlights the most relevant CVEs reported throughout the year, along with key attack vectors observed in real-world campaigns.

CVE-2024‑43451

CVE-2024‑43451 is a vulnerability in Microsoft Windows that enables the leakage of NTLMv2 password hashes with minimal or no user interaction, potentially resulting in credential compromise.

The vulnerability exists thanks to the continued presence of the MSHTML engine, a legacy component originally developed for Internet Explorer. Although Internet Explorer has been officially deprecated, MSHTML remains embedded in modern Windows systems for backward compatibility, particularly with applications and interfaces that still rely on its rendering or link-handling capabilities. This dependency allows .url files to silently invoke NTLM authentication processes through crafted links without necessarily being open. While directly opening the malicious .url file reliably triggers the exploit, the vulnerability may also be activated through alternative user actions such as right clicking, deleting, single-clicking, or just moving the file to a different folder.

Attackers can exploit this flaw by initiating NTLM authentication over SMB to a remote server they control (specifying a URL in UNC path format), thereby capturing the user’s hash. By obtaining the NTLMv2 hash, an attacker can execute a pass-the-hash attack (e.g. by using tools like WMIExec or PSExec) to gain network access by impersonating a valid user, without the need to know the user’s actual credentials.

A particular case of this vulnerability occurs when attackers use WebDAV servers, a set of extensions to the HTTP protocol, which enables collaboration on files hosted on web servers. In this case, a minimal interaction with the malicious file, such as a single click or a right click, triggers automatic connection to the server, file download, and execution. The attackers use this flaw to deliver malware or other payloads to the target system. They also may combine this with hash leaking, for example, by installing a malicious tool on the victim system and using the captured hashes to perform lateral movement through that tool.

The vulnerability was addressed by Microsoft in its November 2024 security updates. In patched environments, motion, deletion, right-clicking the crafted .url file, etc. won’t trigger a connection to a malicious server. However, when the user opens the exploit, it will still work.

After the disclosure, the number of attacks exploiting the vulnerability grew exponentially. By July this year, we had detected around 600 suspicious .url files that contain the necessary characteristics for the exploitation of the vulnerability and could represent a potential threat.

BlindEagle campaign delivering Remcos RAT via CVE-2024-43451

BlindEagle is an APT threat actor targeting Latin American entities, which is known for their versatile campaigns that mix espionage and financial attacks. In late November 2024, the group started a new attack targeting Colombian entities, using the Windows vulnerability CVE-2024-43451 to distribute Remcos RAT. BlindEagle created .url files as a novel initial dropper. These files were delivered through phishing emails impersonating Colombian government and judicial entities and using alleged legal issues as a lure. Once the recipients were convinced to download the malicious file, simply interacting with it would trigger a request to a WebDAV server controlled by the attackers, from which a modified version of Remcos RAT was downloaded and executed. This version contained a module dedicated to stealing cryptocurrency wallet credentials.

The attackers executed the malware automatically by specifying port 80 in the UNC path. This allowed the connection to be made directly using the WebDAV protocol over HTTP, thereby bypassing an SMB connection. This type of connection also leaks NTLM hashes. However, we haven’t seen any subsequent usage of these hashes.

Following this campaign and throughout 2025, the group persisted in launching multiple attacks using the same initial attack vector (.url files) and continued to distribute Remcos RAT.

We detected more than 60 .url files used as initial droppers in BlindEagle campaigns. These were sent in emails impersonating Colombian judicial authorities. All of them communicated via WebDAV with servers controlled by the group and initiated the attack chain that used ShadowLadder or Smoke Loader to finally load Remcos RAT in memory.

Head Mare campaigns against Russian targets abusing CVE-2024-43451

Another attack detected after the Microsoft disclosure involves the hacktivist group Head Mare. This group is known for perpetrating attacks against Russian and Belarusian targets.

In past campaigns, Head Mare exploited various vulnerabilities as part of its techniques to gain initial access to its victims’ infrastructure. This time, they used CVE 2024-43451. The group distributed a ZIP file via phishing emails under the name “Договор на предоставление услуг №2024-34291” (“Service Agreement No. 2024-34291”). This had a .url file named “Сопроводительное письмо.docx” (translated as “Cover letter.docx”).

The .url file connected to a remote SMB server controlled by the group under the domain:
document-file[.]ru/files/documents/zakupki/MicrosoftWord.exe
The domain resolved to the IP address 45.87.246.40 belonging to the ASN 212165, used by the group in the campaigns previously reported by our team.
According to our telemetry data, the ZIP file was distributed to 121 users, 50% of whom belong to the manufacturing sector, 35% to education and science, and 5% to government entities, among other sectors. Of all the targets, 22 users interacted with the .url file.

To achieve their goals at the targeted companies, Head Mare used a number of publicly available tools, including open-source software, to perform lateral movement and privilege escalation, forwarding the leaked hashes. Among these tools detected in previous attacks are Mimikatz, Secretsdump, WMIExec, and SMBExec, with the last three being part of the Impacket suite tool.

In this campaign, we detected attempts to exploit the vulnerability CVE-2023-38831 in WinRAR, used as an initial access in a campaign that we had reported previously, and in two others, we found attempts to use tools related to Impacket and SMBMap.

The attack, in addition to collecting NTLM hashes, involved the distribution of the PhantomCore malware, part of the group’s arsenal.

CVE-2025-24054/CVE-2025-24071

CVE-2025-24071 and CVE-2025-24054, initially registered as two different vulnerabilities, but later consolidated under the second CVE, is an NTLM hash leak vulnerability affecting multiple Windows versions, including Windows 11 and Windows Server. The vulnerability is primarily exploited through specially crafted files, such as .library-ms files, which cause the system to initiate NTLM authentication requests to attacker-controlled servers.

This exploitation is similar to CVE-2024-43451 and requires little to no user interaction (such as previewing a file), enabling attackers to capture NTLMv2 hashes and gain unauthorized access or escalate privileges within the network. The most common and widespread exploitation of this vulnerability occurs with .library-ms files inside ZIP/RAR archives, as it is easy to trick users into opening or previewing them. In most incidents we observed, the attackers used ZIP archives as the distribution vector.

Trojan distribution in Russia via CVE-2025-24054

In Russia, we identified a campaign distributing malicious ZIP archives with the subject line “акт_выполненных_работ_апрель” (certificate of work completed April). These files inside the archives masqueraded as .xls spreadsheets but were in fact .library-ms files that automatically initiated a connection to servers controlled by the attackers. The malicious files contained the same embedded server IP address 185.227.82.72.

When the vulnerability was exploited, the file automatically connected to that server, which also hosted versions of the AveMaria Trojan (also known as Warzone) for distribution. AveMaria is a remote access Trojan (RAT) that gives attackers remote control to execute commands, exfiltrate files, perform keylogging, and maintain persistence.

CVE-2025-33073

CVE-2025-33073 is a high-severity NTLM reflection vulnerability in the Windows SMB client’s access control. An authenticated attacker within the network can manipulate SMB authentication, particularly via local relay, to coerce a victim’s system into authenticating back to itself as SYSTEM. This allows the attacker to escalate privileges and execute code at the highest level.

The vulnerability relies on a flaw in how Windows determines whether a connection is local or remote. By crafting a specific DNS hostname that partially overlaps with the machine’s own name, an attacker can trick the system into believing the authentication request originates from the same host. When this happens, Windows switches into a “local authentication” mode, which bypasses the normal NTLM challenge-response exchange and directly injects the user’s token into the host’s security subsystem. If the attacker has coerced the victim into connecting to the crafted hostname, the token provided is essentially the machine’s own, granting the attacker privileged access on the host itself.

This behavior emerges because the NTLM protocol sets a special flag and context ID whenever it assumes the client and server are the same entity. The attacker’s manipulation causes the operating system to treat an external request as internal, so the injected token is handled as if it were trusted. This self-reflection opens the door for the adversary to act with SYSTEM-level privileges on the target machine.

Suspicious activity in Uzbekistan involving CVE-2025-33073

We have detected suspicious activity exploiting the vulnerability on a target belonging to the financial sector in Uzbekistan.

We have obtained a traffic dump related to this activity, and identified multiple strings within this dump that correspond to fragments related to NTLM authentication over SMB. The dump contains authentication negotiations showing SMB dialects, NTLMSSP messages, hostnames, and domains. In particular, the indicators:

• The hostname localhost1UWhRCAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAwbEAYBAAAA, a manipulated hostname used to trick Windows into treating the authentication as local
• The presence of the IPC$ resource share, common in NTLM relay/reflection attacks, because it allows an attacker to initiate authentication and then perform actions reusing that authenticated session

The incident began with exploitation of the NTLM reflection vulnerability. The attacker used a crafted DNS record to coerce the host into authenticating against itself and obtain a SYSTEM token. After that, the attacker checked whether they had sufficient privileges to execute code using batch files that ran simple commands such as whoami:
%COMSPEC% /Q /c echo whoami ^> %SYSTEMROOT%\Temp\__output > %TEMP%\execute.bat & %COMSPEC% /Q /c %TEMP%\execute.bat & del %TEMP%\execute.bat
Persistence was then established by creating a suspicious service entry in the registry under:
reg:\\REGISTRY\MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Services\YlHXQbXO
With SYSTEM privileges, the attacker attempted several methods to dump LSASS (Local Security Authority Subsystem Service) memory:

1. Using rundll32.exe:
   C:\Windows\system32\cmd.exe /Q /c CMD.exe /Q /c for /f "tokens=1,2 delims= " ^%A in ('"tasklist /fi "Imagename eq lsass.exe" | find "lsass""') do rundll32.exe C:\windows\System32\comsvcs.dll, #+0000^24 ^%B \Windows\Temp\vdpk2Y.sav fullThe command locates the lsass.exe process, which holds credentials in memory, extracts its PID, and invokes an internal function of comsvcs.dll to dump LSASS memory and save it. This technique is commonly used in post-exploitation (e.g., Mimikatz or other “living off the land” tools).
2. Loading a temporary DLL (BDjnNmiX.dll):
   C:\Windows\system32\cmd.exe /Q /c cMd.exE /Q /c for /f "tokens=1,2 delims= " ^%A in ('"tAsKLISt /fi "Imagename eq lSAss.ex*" | find "lsass""') do rundll32.exe C:\Windows\Temp\BDjnNmiX.dll #+0000^24 ^%B \Windows\Temp\sFp3bL291.tar.log fullThe command tries to dump the LSASS memory again, but this time using a custom DLL.
3. Running a PowerShell script (Base64-encoded):
   The script leverages MiniDumpWriteDump via reflection. It uses the Out-Minidump function that writes a process dump with all process memory to disk, similar to running procdump.exe.

Several minutes later, the attacker attempted lateral movement by writing to the administrative share of another host, but the attempt failed. We didn’t see any evidence of further activity.

Protection and recommendations

Disable/Limit NTLM

As long as NTLM remains enabled, attackers can exploit vulnerabilities in legacy authentication methods. Disabling NTLM, or at the very least limiting its use to specific, critical systems, significantly reduces the attack surface. This change should be paired with strict auditing to identify any systems or applications still dependent on NTLM, helping ensure a secure and seamless transition.

Implement message signing

NTLM works as an authentication layer over application protocols such as SMB, LDAP, and HTTP. Many of these protocols offer the ability to add signing to their communications. One of the most effective ways to mitigate NTLM relay attacks is by enabling SMB and LDAP signing. These security features ensure that all messages between the client and server are digitally signed, preventing attackers from tampering with or relaying authentication traffic. Without signing, NTLM credentials can be intercepted and reused by attackers to gain unauthorized access to network resources.

Enable Extended Protection for Authentication (EPA)

EPA ties NTLM authentication to the underlying TLS or SSL session, ensuring that captured credentials cannot be reused in unauthorized contexts. This added validation can be applied to services such as web servers and LDAP, significantly complicating the execution of NTLM relay attacks.

Monitor and audit NTLM traffic and authentication logs

Regularly reviewing NTLM authentication logs can help identify abnormal patterns, such as unusual source IP addresses or an excessive number of authentication failures, which may indicate potential attacks. Using SIEM tools and network monitoring to track suspicious NTLM traffic enhances early threat detection and enables a faster response.

Conclusions

In 2025, NTLM remains deeply entrenched in Windows environments, continuing to offer cybercriminals opportunities to exploit its long-known weaknesses. While Microsoft has announced plans to phase it out, the protocol’s pervasive presence across legacy systems and enterprise networks keeps it relevant and vulnerable. Threat actors are actively leveraging newly disclosed flaws to refine credential relay attacks, escalate privileges, and move laterally within networks, underscoring that NTLM still represents a major security liability.

The surge of NTLM-focused incidents observed throughout 2025 illustrates the growing risks of depending on outdated authentication mechanisms. To mitigate these threats, organizations must accelerate deprecation efforts, enforce regular patching, and adopt more robust identity protection frameworks. Otherwise, NTLM will remain a convenient and recurring entry point for attackers.

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