How Industrial Robot Safety Was Written in Blood

It was January 25th of 1979, at an unassuming Michigan Ford Motor Company factory. Productivity over the past years had been skyrocketing due to increased automation, courtesy of Litton Industry’s industrial robots that among other things helped to pick parts from shelves. Unfortunately, on that day there was an issue with the automated inventory system, so Robert Williams was asked to retrieve parts manually.

As he climbed into the third level of the storage rack, he was crushed from behind by the arm of one of the still active one-ton transfer vehicles, killing him instantly. It would take half an hour before his body was discovered, and many years before the manufacturer would be forced to pay damages to his estate in a settlement. He only lived to be twenty-five years old.

Since Robert’s gruesome death, industrial robots have become much safer, with keep-out zones, sensors, and other safety measures. However this didn’t happen overnight; it’s worth going over some of the robot tragedies to see how we got here.

Just Following Orders

Perhaps the the most terrifying aspect about most industrial robots is that they are fairly simple machines, often just an arm containing a series of stepper motors and the electronics that strictly execute the tasks programmed into it when the manufacturing line was designed and assembled. This means a large metal arm, possibly weighing more than an adult human, that can swing and move around rapidly, with no regard for what might be in between its starting and end position unless designed with safeties in place.
Artist’s depiction of the accident involving a 34-year old US worker and an industrial robot. (Credit: US NIOSH)
This is what led to the death in 1981 of another factory worker, Kenji Urada, a maintenance worker, who was trying to fix a robotic arm. Although a safety fence had been installed at this Japanese plant that would disconnect the power supply of the robot when this fence was unhooked, for some reason Kenji decided to bypass this safety feature and hop over the fence. Moments later he would be dead, crushed by the robotic arm as it accidentally was activated by Kenji while in manual mode.

During the following investigation it was found that Kenji’s colleagues were unfamiliar with the robot’s controls and did not know how to turn it off by simply opening the fence. Subsequently they were unable to render him any aid and were forced to look on in horror until someone was able to power down the robot.

A similar accident occurred in the US in 1984, when a 34-year old operator of an automated die-cast system decided to cross the safety rail around the robot’s operating envelope to clean up some scrap metal on the floor, bypassing the interlocked access in the safety rail. In this case it wasn’t the arm that crushed the worker, but the back end, which the worker apparently had deemed to be ‘safe’. He had received a one-week training course in robotics three weeks prior.

Protecting Squishy Humans

ISO 7010 style warning sign for industrial robots. (Credit: Clemenspool, Wikimedia)
When it comes to industrial robot safety rules, we have to consider a number of factors beyond the straightforward fact that getting crushed by one is a scenario that a reasonable person would want to avoid. The first is that industrial robots are quite expensive, which makes adding major fencing and other safety measures not much of a financial issue in comparison.

The second factor is that while humans are really quite versatile, they tend to have the annoying habit of bypassing safeties despite endless briefings and drills that are designed for their own protection. Let’s call this factor “human nature”. Kenji Urada’s gruesome death is an example of this, but other industries are rife with examples too, giving agencies like the US Chemical Safety Board a seemingly endless collection of safety rule violations to investigate and condense into popular YouTube videos of disaster sequences.

The final, third factor that ties all of this together is that we no longer live in the early decades of the Industrial Revolution, where having a human worker getting caught with an arm between some gears, or crushed by a mechanism would only lead to some clerk rolling their eyes, crossing out a name and sending out an errand boy to post a fresh ‘help wanted’ note.

Ergo, we needed to find ways to human-proof industrial robots against humans and protect us against ourselves.

ISO 10218

Although some nations have their own standards, the overarching international standard is found in ISO 10218, currently in its 2025 update. This standard comes in two parts, ISO 10218-1, which concerns itself with the robot’s individual parts and targets robot manufacturers, as well as ISO 10218-2, which looks at complete systems and the integration of robots.
Germany bakery robots for palletizing food products. Note the plentiful safety fencing. (Credit: KUKA Roboter GmbH, Bachmann)
There are a number of distinct types of hazards when it comes to working around industrial robots, the most obvious of which is the crushing hazard. To prevent this and similar hazards, we can install plentiful of safety fencing to ensure that the squishy human cannot get within the range of the unsuspecting robot.

In the case of an especially persistent human, or potentially a legitimate human maintainer or operator, it’s crucial to ensure that the robot is powered down or rendered harmless in some other way. For example, the safety fence that should have prevented Kenji Urada from losing his life was designed for this, but unfortunately could be bypassed.

Similarly, in the case of Robert Williams there was a tag in/tag out system in place for the robotics, but Robert had not been instructed in this and apparently unaware of the dangers. Being able to bypass such safeties gets us firmly sliding down the rabbit hole of the hierarchy of controls.

The most effective hazard elimination is basically that, but since the robots are rather needed, and we got no replacement for them other than forcing the humans to do all the work again, this step is no real option here.

Next we can try to make robots safer, by adding intrusion detection sensors to the robot’s hazard zone, or as Amazon trialed in 2019 by making the squishy humans in its warehouses wear a device that alerts the robots around them on the warehouse floor of their presence without relying on either machine vision or obstacle recognition.

The placing of physical barriers is next, as part of engineering controls. This effectively tries to prevent humans from wandering into the danger zone like a particularly big fly around a brightly lit up bug zapper. Theoretically by putting a sufficiently daunting barrier between the hazard and the worker will said worker not end up facing their doom.

In an ideal world this would be all that it’d take to guarantee a completely safe work floor, even in the case of some distracted wandering. Of course, this doesn’t help much if said robots are sharing a warehouse floor with humans. To patch up the remaining gaps we got safety training courses as part of the administrative controls, but if these were very effective then the USCSB would already be mostly out of a job.,

The final item in the hierarchy of PPE can easily be skipped in the case of industrial robots, other than perhaps steel-tipped boots, a hard-hat and safety glasses in case of dropped items and flying debris. If an industrial robot’s arm is headed your way, there’s no PPE that will save your skin.

The Future

At this point in time industrial robots are fairly safe from humans, though in the US alone between 1992 and 2015 at least 61 people died due to sharing the same physical space with such a robot or a similar unfortunate event. As the number of robots increases in industry, but also in construction and health care, the topic of safety becomes ever more important.

In the case of a stationary industrial robot it’s fairly easy to just put a big, tall fence around it, lock the only gate and force anyone who absolutely needs access to beg an audience with the maintenance chief. In the case of the thousands of robots rolling around in warehouses like Amazon’s, situational awareness on the part of the robots can help them detect and avoid obstacles.

As long as humans are more fragile and weaker than the robots that they find themselves working around, it’s probably reasonable to expect said humans to pay a modicum of respect to the Death Machine, as the engineers who built them can only add so many technological solutions to what ultimately ends up being a game of idiot-proofing. Because absolutely nobody would ever do these exact things to willingly endanger themselves and/or others.

hackaday.com/2026/02/05/how-in…

Electronic Waste Graveyard Immortalizes Dead Electronics

Everyone here can think of a cloud-connected product that was killed because the company that made it stopped supporting it. While these corporations have forgotten their products, the US PIRG Education Fund has immortalized them in their Electronic Waste Graveyard.

With an estimated “130,000,000 pounds of electronic waste” produced since 2014, the amount of wasted resources is staggering. The advent of the cloud promised us reduced waste as lightweight devices could rely on remote brains to keep the upgrades going long after a traditional device would have been unable to keep up. The opposite seems to have occurred, wreaking havoc on the environment and pocketbooks.

Of course, we can count on hackers to circumvent the end of companies or services, but while that gives us plenty of fodder for projects, it isn’t so great for the normal folks who make up the rest of the population. We appreciate PIRG giving such a visceral reminder of the cost of business-as-usual for those who aren’t always thinking about material usage and waste.

If PIRG sounds familiar, they’re one of the many groups keeping an eye on Right-to-Repair legislation. We’ve been keeping an eye on it too with places like the EU, Texas, and Washington moving the ball forward on reducing e-waste and keeping devices running longer.

hackaday.com/2026/02/05/electr…

#Russia general Vladimir Alexeev, first deputy of the head of #GRU was shot in his apartment in Moscow. Here’s some details from VChK-OGPU (Rucriminal.info):

A source from the Cheka-OGPU and Rucriminal.info said that the killer entered the building and waited for Vladimir Alekseev, the first deputy head of the GRU, on the 24th floor, where he lives with his family. According to neighbours, many did not know that their neighbour was a military commander — in the building’s chat group, they initially wrote: ‘an ordinary family with a child.’

Residents of the residential complex complained that the fire alarm had gone off in the building the day before and the lifts were not working properly. According to residents, there was a ‘passageway’ on the fire escape where homeless people slept. Apparently, the killer used this passageway because there are CCTV cameras in the lifts.

In addition, the cameras on the floors are not working (in a chat, neighbours wrote that the management company promised to fix them after the New Year, but did not do so), and the video quality of the entrance and street cameras is very poor. According to local resident Anastasia, she heard security forces at the entrance and in the neighbouring Magnit store discussing that there were no working cameras or video recordings.

According to Yulia, a real estate agent who lives next door to the general, she heard gunshots and cries of ‘Help!’ early in the morning. She left her flat and saw Alekseev lying in a pool of blood on the floor, while a neighbour (presumably the military commander’s wife) was shouting, ‘Call an ambulance, he’s been shot!’

The eyewitness claims that the general was conscious when she left her flat, but had lost a lot of blood. ‘The whole floor is covered in blood,’ Yulia wrote in the chat. She asked Vladimir Alekseev’s wife if she needed help, but the woman was in shock and refused.

According to another neighbour, the ambulance did not leave the entrance for about 15 minutes after loading the wounded man into the cabin. Doctors performed emergency resuscitation measures on the spot. According to our information, Alekseev is in serious condition in the intensive care unit of one of the city’s hospitals.

Source: x.com/rucriminalinfo/status/20…

When Mains Networking Fails, Use Phone Wires

A quiet shift over the last couple of decades in many places has been the disappearance of the traditional copper phone line. First the corded landline phone was replaced by cordless, then the phone migrated to a mobile device, and finally DSL connections are being supplanted by fiber. This leaves copper-era infrastructure in houses, which [TheHFTguy] decided to use for Ethernet.

The hack here isn’t that he bought some specialized network boxes from Germany, though knowing they exist is useful. Instead it comes in his suggestion that they use the same technology as mains networking. Mains network plugs are a dime a dozen, but noisy power lines can make them of limited use. Our hacking curiosity is whetted by the question of whether a cheap mains networking plug can have its networking — in reality a set of RF subcarriers — separated from its mains power supply, and persuaded to do the same job at a fraction of the cost. Come on commenters – has anyone ever tried this?

hackaday.com/2026/02/05/when-m…

#Russia military blogger posted an ironic comment on the #Starlink woes of his colleagues: “The Second Army of the World is begging an American businessman to restore their communications”

As a reminder “Second Army of the World” was a popular self-denomination that Russia routinely boasted about before 2022. After, they somehow stopped using it 😉

#Playfra OSINT channel meanwhile posted some updates on the observed activity of Russian assaults:

After unregistered users were cut off from using the terminal, Russian attack intensity suddenly and sharply dropped, at least in the Ternuvate and Borova directions, and likely dropped in many other areas too, which I’m currently clarifying.

Kostyantynivka - yes. Russian attacks generally slowed down. The biggest difference is noticeable with attacks coming from the Chasiv Yar side, but a slowing down is also noticed in the other parts of the direction.

An #Ukraine military engineer posted his account on front-line comms before and after Starlink - this applies to both sides equally, except Russians no longer have Starlink:

Once, they laid 3 kilometers of field cable for us across the field to ensure communication between the gun and the drone; one such time, the guy pulling the field cable arrived only after the shooting had ended (we’d adjusted by coordinates, no time to wait), and he told us that the field he’d been dragging it through was a bit mined.

In the conditions of modern warfare, laying wired communication and maintaining it in proper condition in frontline zones is extremely difficult, even when there’s no shelling—cables get gnawed by mice, worn through by wind, torn up by wild boars, twists oxidize, and so on.

So the alternative is Wi-Fi networks, but they’re limited too: building a bridge requires radio horizon, where it’s absent, you need to set up intermediate nodes, each node needs power and maintenance.

On top of that, the bandwidth of such a network isn’t all that high, and it drops with each node, plus if the main line breaks, the whole branch goes down, and an entire section of the front might be left without comms.

In the era of Starlinks, these networks were built for redundancy, but they themselves had to be backed up via Starlink or by connecting to local providers’ communication networks.
It works, but it’s heavily limited, and laying a dozen streams over such a network to HQ is quite challenging. That’s why Starlink gives such an advantage.

Russian channel, quoted by Playfra:

“After the blocking of Starlink, our soldiers on the frontline urgently need our help to launch attacks and repel enemy attacks. Due to the blocking of Starlink terminals, the command and control of troops has become difficult on almost all fronts. Soldiers are writing to us and asking for help with equipment - radio bridges and radio stations.”